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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the broadband era, regulators have expressed concern
that vertically integrated broadband service providers (“BSPs”)—those providers who control access to last mile connections as well as affiliated content—
possess the ability and the incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated content
and applications providers, such as online video content providers.1 The focus
of the concern has been to assure the neutral treatment of data traffic associated
with the provision of basic Internet access service.2 Over the last few years, the
market for the home delivery of video-programming services has been in disequilibrium due, in part, to technological developments, one of the most important being the dramatic increase in wireline broadband Internet connection
speeds in the last mile (also referred to as the local loop).3 Two events accom1
See In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report and
Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17,915 & n.46 (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Broadband Report &
Order]. The FCC believes that broadband providers have at least three incentives for restricting the availability of content on the Internet: First, broadband providers might block
access to content to benefit its own affiliated offerings or they might be paid by competitors
to limit the content of other competitors. Id. at 17,915. Second, broadband providers might
seek to charge content providers a premium for prioritizing access to end users. Id. at
17,919. Third, broadband providers, through prioritizing access for certain edge services,
might degrade the quality of Internet service to other non-prioritized services. See id. at
17,922. The FCC was so concerned by these perverse incentives that it first promulgated a
set of principles for the openness of the Internet. See generally In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20
F.C.C.R. 14,986 (2005).
2
Dina R. Richman, The Shot Heard Round the World Wide Web: Comcast Violates Net
Neutrality, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2008) (providing examples of legislation
intended to ensure net neutrality).
3
Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, at 17,911 & n.23 (noting that, for example,
by “the late 1990s, a residential end user could download content at speeds not achievable
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pany the increase in last-mile wireline speeds. First, there is an explosion of
streaming video as the Internet’s dominant form of traffic and, second, there is
a reconfiguration of the links in how large applications and content providers
transmit their data to the outer edges of broadband service providers’ networks.4
These shocks to the existing equilibrium have invoked varied responses by
incumbent BSPs. For instance, BSPs have sought additional remuneration for
the increased streaming from those content providers (such as Netflix) whose
data are increasingly in demand by end users.5 The contrast between the large
BSPs and the smaller BSPs in the perception of their responsibility to their end
users for delivery of streaming video (from Internet video distributors such as
Netflix, Hulu, or YouTube) is demonstrated by the conflict over the streaming
of Netflix’s videos. Time Warner Communications has demanded that Netflix
pay to transmit its content to end users.6 In contrast, the smaller BSPs, like
RCN, have allowed Netflix to install its equipment into their data centers,
which provides end users with a better viewing experience.7 The differing approaches reveal a stark difference between the large and small BSPs. Large
BSPs have the leverage and the incentives to demand increased compensation
from heavily trafficked content providers. Smaller BSPs are more likely to
agree to arrangements that enable the end user to access stream content from
the heavily trafficked providers.
This article examines how large, vertically integrated BSPs (such as Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Verizon, AT&T, and Cablevision) are responding to
the growth of online video distributors (“OVDs”) as emerging substitute providers of video programming. The large BSPs also operate as cable and satellite companies that are known as multichannel video programming distributors
(“MVPDs”). The OVDs compete with satellite and cable television companies.
Therefore, the conflict arises from the dual roles played by large BSPs, who
both distribute and produce video content. The conflict arises from the fact that
the OVDs depend upon the bandwidth provided by their competitors—the sateven on the Internet backbone during the 1980s”).
4
John Markoff, Striving to Map the Shape-Shifting Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at
D1; see also id. at 17,911 & n.23.
5
Id. at 17,913; see also Jon Brodkin, Verizon Seeks Payment for Carrying Netflix Traffic, WSJ Reports, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 19, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2014/02/verizon-seeks-payment-for-carrying-netflix-traffic-wsj-reports/
(discussing the tensions between Netflix and BSPs over streaming Netflix’s video content).
6
Jon Brodkin, Why YouTube Buffers: The Secret Deals That Make—and Break—
Online Video, ARS TECHNICA (July 28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secret-deals-that-make-and-break-onlinevideo/4/.
7
Id.
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ellite and, especially, cable companies.
BSPs’ response to the OVDs is analyzed along two dimensions. In Part II,
the changing power relationship between BSPs, Internet backbone providers,
and content delivery networks (“CDNs”) is examined. This shifting power dynamic stems from the proliferation of bandwidth-intensive content, applications, and services. To more fully understand the aspects of the competition
between BSPs providing video distribution services and OVDs, it is important
to incorporate into the analysis the entire communications link. The analysis
should follow the content stream from the OVD’s server to the end user. The
analysis should not be limited to focusing only on the “last mile”—that is, the
link from the BSP’s router to the end user. In short, the growth of online video
has caused a change in structure of Internet markets.
In Part III, the relationship between BSPs, end users, and OVDs over the
last mile is investigated with a focus on the role of specialized services as an
option to the provision of Internet services offered through the BSP’s basic
Internet access service (“BIAS”). This issue is examined in detail by considering two case studies: (1) Comcast’s decision to exempt its Xfinity video on
demand service from data caps for its end users, and (2) the impact of the
Comcast-NBCU merger on the provision of online services over last mile facilities.
Part IV provides a brief conclusion. In short, it is concluded that the FCC
must pay more attention in the formulation of openness rules to the linkages
between interconnection issues, specialized services issues, and rules governing the treatment of traffic by BSPs.
II. ISSUE 1—INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES AND THE BALANCE
OF POWER
In 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the
Open Internet Order.8 The Order mandated a limited set of openness rules that
place legal responsibilities on BSPs, targeted to ensure the neutral treatment of
all content, applications, or service providers’ traffic in the last mile.9 Specifically, BSPs are not allowed to block access to or to discriminate against content, applications, and service providers.10 The ability to discriminate against
traffic is subject to a “no unreasonable discrimination” standard.11 To clarify
Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, app. A; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011).
47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011); see also Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, at 17,906,
17,931.
10 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.5, 8.7 (2011).
11 47 C.F.R. § 8.7.
8
9
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that standard, the FCC states that “a commercial arrangement between a
broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic
over other traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of the broadband provider (i.e. ‘pay for priority’) would raise significant cause for concern.”12 The openness rules have important exceptions, such
as not affecting existing networking-interconnection arrangements.13 These
exceptions could enable BSPs to evade the spirit of the FCC’s openness goals,
as demonstrated in the Comcast-Level 3 dispute analyzed below, and effectively shift power to the BSPs in their relationships with other key stakeholders
in the Internet ecosystem.14 In short, BSPs can engage legally in discriminatory
conduct that falls outside the reach of the Open Internet rules.
The regulatory focus on the public Internet and the last mile has caused
BSPs to try different tactics to maintain their dominance.15 An example of the
reaction of BSPs to the growth of streaming video can be examined by considering the dispute in 2010 between Level 3, an Internet backbone provider and
CDN provider, and Comcast, the largest MVPD in the US and the subsequent
reactions to it.16 Prior to the dispute, Level 3 and Comcast had a business relationship that consisted of two key components. As to the first component,
Comcast was a transit customer of Level 3, that is, Comcast bought Internet
capacity from Level 3.17 As to the second component, because Level 3 also
operated as a CDN, it directly exchanged traffic (“on-net” traffic) with Comcast on a settlement-free basis.18 Comcast sought to renegotiate the business
relationship with respect to Level 3’s CDN business in light of two significant,
concurrent events. The demand for Internet video was growing (and continues
to grow) at a phenomenal rate,19 primarily as the result of Netflix’s booming
online business.20 Second, Level 3 contracted with Netflix, so Level 3 became

Broadband Report & Order, at 17,947.
Id. at 17,944 n.209.
14 Id. at 17,944 n.209, 17,965–66.
15 Nate Anderson, Peering Problems: Digging into the Comcast/Level 3 Grudgematch,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/comcastlevel3/
(discussing a new strategy used by Comcast).
16 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Fifteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 10,496, 10,506 (2013) [hereinafter
Delivery of Video Programming Report].
17 Daniel Golding, The Real Story Behind the Comcast-Level 3 Battle, GIGAOM (Dec. 1,
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/01/comcast-level-3-battle/.
18 Id.
19 See Jacob Minne, Data Caps: How ISPs are Stunting the Growth of Online Video
Distributors and What Regulators can do about it, 65 FED COMM. L.J. 233, 242 (2012) (noting that Internet video traffic is expected to rise from 37% to 62% by 2015).
20 Delivery of Video Programming Report, supra note 16, at 10,646.
12
13
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Netflix’s Internet carrier for traffic requested by Netflix’s subscribers.21 Given
these two events, Comcast demanded that Level 3 now pay to deliver “on-net”
traffic to Comcast’s customers, a relationship referred to as “paid peering.”22
Level 3 would then become for Comcast both a vendor of transit services and a
customer of paid peering services.23 In summary, Comcast argued that it should
be paid two times: once by its broadband subscribers and again by the Internet
carrier delivering the video traffic directly to the local network.
Comcast’s justification for the additional payment was based on the large
imbalance of traffic it now directly exchanged with Level 3.24 Comcast argued
that the increased traffic from Level 3 increased Comcast’s costs.25 Level 3
complained that Comcast was violating the openness rules by raising the costs
of online video delivery that can be considered as a substitute for aspects of
Comcast’s video delivery.26 The parameters of the dispute can be understood
by the answers to the two following questions. First, on what segment of cyberspace is the dispute located and how is the dispute related to the Open Internet rules? Second, does the dispute reflect a change in the economic structure of Internet markets?
Comcast portrayed the dispute as an ordinary peering dispute that only involves one segment of the Internet: the upstream business relationship between
a BSP and a backbone/CDN provider.27 Level 3 painted the dispute in broader
terms, claiming that it demonstrated the “risk of a ‘closed’ Internet, where a
retail [BSP] decides how their subscribers interact with content.”28 It is incorrect to focus only on one segment of the Internet, because the effects of decisions centered on one segment impact other segments of the Internet. In economic terms, a focus on the effects in one market is called a partial equilibrium
Golding, supra note 17.
Minne, supra note 19, at 241–43.
23 Anderson, supra note 15.
24 Id. (noting Comcast’s claim that it lacked the necessary infrastructure to meet Level
3’s demands).
25 Id.
26 Press Release, Level 3, Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast’s
Actions
(Nov.
29,
2010),
http://level3.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=23600&item=65045 [hereinafter Level 3 Press
Release].
27 Letter from Joseph W. Was, Jr., Vice President, Comcast Corp., and Lynn R. Charytan, Vice President, Comcast Corp., to Sharon Gillett, Chief of Wireline Competition Bureau,
F.C.C.,
at
1
(Nov.
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/About/PressRoom/Documents/Comcastexparte1
130.pdf (“[D]espite Level 3’s effort to portray its dispute with Comcast as being about an
‘open Internet,’ it is nothing but a good old-fashioned commercial peering dispute, the kind
that Level 3 has found itself in before.”).
28 Level 3 Press Release, supra note 26.
21
22
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analysis.29 A more complete examination of economic effects of a decision
would utilize a general equilibrium analysis, which traces the effects in one
market and how those effects impact related markets.30 Applying the general
equilibrium analysis to the dispute indicates that a decision on one side of a
BSP’s business (in this case, upstream access to the backbone of the Internet)
also impacts the other sides of its business (in this case, downstream access to
end users).31
One purpose of the openness rules is to prevent vertically integrated BSPs
from discriminating against unaffiliated content, applications, and service providers.32 The FCC argued that BSPs have both the ability and incentive to engage in such discrimination.33 The rules focused on ensuring nondiscriminatory
treatment of traffic over the last mile.34 This ignores how BSPs can outsource
the discrimination upstream while still treating all packets neutrally in the last
mile. As the FCC explains, “By interfering with the transmission of third parties’ Internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for particular
edge providers, telephone and cable companies can make those services less
attractive to subscribers in comparison to their own offerings.”35 In economic
terms, the basic concern is to prevent a BSP from leveraging its power over the
last mile into adjacent markets. BSPs appear to have accomplished the “raising
of rivals costs” by letting their interconnection ports fill up (meaning that there
is insufficient capacity for the connections) in which they exchange traffic with
backbone/CDN providers as video traffic has increased.36 This causes end users
to experience poor streaming video quality when watching videos from OVDs,
such as Netflix and YouTube.37 Large BSPs have responded to this traffic degradation by imposing an additional charge on the backbone/CDN provider (for
example, Level 3); and, in turn, the backbone/CDN provider will pass on the
increased costs of sending traffic to its customers (for example, Netflix).38
The FCC’s position has been that because the backbone segment of the In29 The WTO explains that partial equilibrium analysis “focuses on one or multiple specific markets or products.” WTO, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS 8
(2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wto_unctad12_e.pdf.
30 Id.
31 As the WTO notes, in the context of inter-market linkages, the general equilibrium
analysis is preferred when the scope of the analysis is large and when the linkages are important. Id. at 181.
32 Broadband Report & Order, at 17,906, 17,915.
33 Id. at 17,915–18, 17,935.
34 Id. at 17,915–27 (focusing on the BSPs’ ability to degrade the streaming of content
providers).
35 Id. at 17,918 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 17,925–26.
37 Brodkin, supra note 6.
38 Anderson, supra note 15.
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ternet does not reach the end user and because backbone/CDN providers do not
directly compete with edge providers, there is little need for regulation of that
segment.39 This has meant that interconnection arrangements for backbone traffic have been negotiated without governmental intervention.40 Because video
traffic has grown in importance and because there is a need for data-intensive
video not to be subject to delay and interruption in delivery to end users, the
economic leverage of BSPs has increased.
The structure of Internet markets varies, depending upon the segment of the
market. The structure of the markets for content, applications, and services—
the FCC refers to these as edge provider markets41—is highly competitive with
limited barriers to entry.42 There are a variety of ways to traffic across the Internet:43 they can use transit services provided by backbone providers, procure
the services of a CDN to transmit data directly to the BSP’s network, or create
their own CDN-like infrastructure.44 In short, edge providers have a range of
options to transmit data. Backbone providers also face competition for the provision of transit and peering services.45
The market for the provision of last mile broadband access is subject to a
varying amount of competition, depending upon how the end user utilizes the
broadband connection. For less data intensive uses, like accessing the web,
wireless broadband complements the wireline broadband service; therefore,
end users enjoy considerable choice among Internet last mile providers.46
However, for highly data intensive uses, such as streaming online video, the
choice among BSPs is much more limited. Table 1 demonstrates that if a residential end user is interested in purchasing a high-speed connection (for purId. at 17,948 n.236.
Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1784 (2011) (“Eight years
or more of intensive debate about network neutrality at the FCC have not even touched the
proper treatment of network-to-network relationships in the Internet backbone.”); see also
Randolph J. May, Level 3’s Retro Regulatory Advocacy: From Loopcos to Loopier, FREE
ST. FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2011), http://freestatefoundation.blogspot.com/2011/02/level-3s-retroregulatory-vision-from.html.
41 Id. at 17,907 n.2.
42 Id. at 17,911.
43 Level 3 Press Release, supra note 26.
44 See Anna-Maria Kovacs, Internet Peering and Transit, TECH POL’Y INST. 1, 9–12
(2012),
available
at
https://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeeringandtransit.pdf. A few of the
large content providers have created their own CDN-like networks. Id. at 12.
45 Id. at 13 (quoting an executive officer of Level 3 as saying that backbone providers’
services are only one choice of many that are available to edge providers).
46 JOHN B. HORRIGAN, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BROADBAND ADOPTION AND USAGE: WHAT HAS FOUR YEARS TAUGHT US? 3–4 (2013), available at
http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/MTI%20Remarks%20%20Broadband%20Adoption%20-%202.6.13.pdf.
39
40
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poses of this article that is defined as at least a downstream speed of 10 Mbps)
cable modem is by far the most likely choice with fiber connections a distant
second. From 2007 to June 2012, aDSL’s percentage of residential use declined, where cable’s residential use increased.47 In the last several years, the
overwhelming majority of new high-speed broadband subscribers are accounted for by cable operators.48 It has been argued that “in many parts of the
country a de facto monopoly on high-speed broadband service [has] resulted in
slow innovation and poor customer service.”49

Table 1: Residential Connections by Downstream Speed Tier, Technology,
and Date
TECHNOLOGY

CONNECTION SPEED
Less Than 10 Mbps

At Least 10 Mbps

June 30, 2012*
aDSL

28,556,000

2,630,000

Cable Modem

14,807,000

34,856,000

Satellite

1,123,000

0

Fiber

601,000

5,698,000

Mobile Wireless

149,792,000

0

December 31, 2010**
aDSL

30,608,000

847,000

Cable Modem

17,719,000

27,592,000

Satellite

Data withheld

0

Fiber

537,000

4,451,000

Mobile Wireless

84,396,000

0

Sources:
* INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2012, at 30 tbl. 10
(2013),
available
at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/D
OC-324884A1.pdf (providing the 2012 data).
INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVSTATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 27, chart 11 (2013), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/DOC-324884A1.pdf.
48 Id.
49 See Timothy B. Lee, Five Things Neither Side of the Broadband Debate Wants to
Admit, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/09/17/5-things-neither-side-of-the-broadband-debate-wants-to-admit/.
47

ICES:
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** INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 31 tbl. 12
(2011),
available
at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/D
OC-324884A1.pdf (providing the 2010 data).
NET

Given the lack of effective competition in high-speed, last mile broadband
connections, it is reasonable to argue that it made sense for the FCC to impose
openness rules on BSPs to ensure that they do not leverage this power into adjacent markets. The economic concern should be to protect content, applications, and service providers that offer competing services to BSPs that are vertically integrated, especially with respect to voice and video services, the legacy services of the dominant BSPs. However, the exclusive focus on the last
mile has caused the FCC to ignore how BSPs can exercise market power via
discriminatory behavior in other segments of the Internet.
For example, the Open Internet Order states unequivocally that BSPs cannot
impose termination fees on edge providers for delivering or carrying traffic to
its end users.50 Despite this categorical statement, the FCC explains that there is
a large exception to the openness rules: the rules do not apply to existing network interconnection arrangements, an apparent reference to the Level 3Comcast dispute.51 The juxtaposition of these statements seems to indicate that
the FCC accepts that the two segments, the last mile segment and the upstream
segment to the backbone, are independent of each other. The FCC fails to recognize that the carve-out for existing network-interconnection arrangements
provides a method by which BSPs can evade the no blocking rule, because,
from the end user’s perspective, there is no practical difference between blocking traffic and degrading interconnection ports. Degrading interconnection
ports and blocking traffic are two activities that interfere with the end user’s
access to content. In fact, several paragraphs earlier in the same section of the
FCC rules, the FCC agrees that “degrading traffic can have the same effects as
outright blocking.”52 The FCC’s exception for existing networkinterconnection arrangements allows BSPs to exercise market power over unaffiliated content, applications, and service providers without violating the letter of the Open Internet Order.
Given this regulatory loophole, the growth of online video, and a trend toBroadband Report & Order, at 17,943–44.
Id. at 17,944 n.209.
52 Id. at 17,943 (“The Commission has recognized that in some circumstances the distinction between blocking and degrading (such as by delaying) traffic is merely ‘semantic.’”).
50
51
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ward consolidation of the BSP market, the balance of power has shifted between BSPs and backbone/CDN providers in favor of BSPs.53 The Level 3 and
Comcast dispute is an early first sign of this change in the balance of power.54
Given the Internet’s architecture, backbone providers had acted as a buffer that
prevented BSPs from exercising control over content, applications, and service
providers. That buffer zone is beginning to disappear as large BSPs accumulate
more subscribers and expand into the provision of backbone services.55 For
instance, the four largest providers of broadband Internet (Comcast, Time
Warner, AT&T, and Verizon) account for almost 70% of all broadband subscribers.56 The subscriber count as of the end of the second quarter 2013 is as
follows: Comcast has 19,986,000; AT&T has 16,453,000; Time Warner has
11,559,000; and Verizon has 8,939,000.57 Large BSPs, like Comcast, are likely
to demand, on an increasing basis, payment from backbone/CDN providers to
supply direct connections to their subscribers.58
Furthermore, large BSPs are reluctant to accept CDN-like equipment from
edge providers to be placed inside the data centers of BSPs. For example, Netflix has created its own CDN and offers to place their storage equipment in or
near the BSP’s network; however, Comcast has not accepted Netflix’s offer.59
Many smaller BSPs found the offer very attractive, because it would enhance
the viewing experience of its broadband subscribers.60 For example, Sonic.net,
a BSP located in California with 50,000 subscribers, embraced the offer since
See Timothy B. Lee, Keeping the Internet Competitive, Spring-2012 NAT’L AFF. 59,
74 (2012) (discussing the power of Comcast (a BSP) over Level 3 and other backbone providers, stating that “Comcast’s leverage over backbone providers has grown with its share of
the broadband market . . . It seems increasingly clear that the economic model of the
[I]nternet is changing”).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 70. In addition, backbone carriers are experiencing pressure from the other
side of their market segment as major content providers are expanding facilities investments
in the Internet backbone. See, e.g., Drew Fitzgerald & Spencer E. Ante, Tech Firms Push to
Control
Web’s
Pipes,
Wall
St.
J.
(Dec.
16,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579262361885883936.
56 Press Release, Leichtman Research Grp., About 295,000 Add Broadband in the Second
Quarter
of
2013,
at
2
(Aug.
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/082013release.pdf.
57 Id.
58 See Lee, supra note 53, at 73 (discussing the regime envisioned by Comcast: backbone providers pay the BSPs for the increased traffic); see also Level 3 Press Release, supra
note 26 (calling such tactics a “toll booth at the borders of [the BSP’s] broadband Internet
access network”).
59 Overview:
Netflix Open Connect Content Delivery Network, NETFLIX,
https://signup.netflix.com/openconnect (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (omitting Comcast, Time
Warner Cable, and Verizon from the list of ISPs that have connected to Netflix’s CDN).
60 Brodkin, supra note 6 (citing RCN’s—a smaller BSP—explanation as to why it accepts Netflix’s equipment: to enhance their customers’ viewing experience).
53
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it would reduce the costs that Netflix traffic imposes on its operations.61 RCN
does experience a small increase in costs to house the equipment but the costs
are outweighed by benefits in the form of a reduction in costs to the BSP for
transit payments and the more reliable streaming experience for its customers.62
On the other hand, Comcast and Time Warner rejected the offer since they expect payment from CDNs and Netflix. Instead, Netflix is offering a free service
to the BSP.63
There are competing arguments for “who should pay who” in interconnection arrangements. First, one can try to identify who causes the traffic flow,
end users or edge providers. Edge providers argue that it is end users who demand/pull the data and, thus, it is the responsibility of the BSP to ensure that
its subscribers have the ability to access data with sufficient capacity and functionality to accommodate the requests both within the local network and at
points of interconnection with other networks.64 BSPs counter that it is the responsibility of edge providers to ensure that the data arrives in a reliable and
usable form to end users.65 To some extent, BSPs are falling back on a “sender
pays” model rooted in telecommunications history,66 which inappropriately
imposes a telecommunications framework on the Internet. Second, and relatedly, BSPs argue that when traffic flows become unbalanced, the party responsible for sending more traffic should pay.67 This tradition is also rooted in telecommunications history.68 The question arises whether it is a legitimate business justification to impose a recurring charge on backbone/CDN providers to
Id.
For discussion of the Sonic.net case, see Stacey Higginbotham, Peering Pressure:
The Secret Battle to Control the Future of the Internet, GIGAOM (June 19, 2013),
http://gigaom.com/2013/06/19/peering-pressure-the-secret-battle-to-control-the-future-ofthe-internet/. For a discussion of the RCN case, see Brodkin, supra note 6.
63 For background, see Brodkin, supra note 6. Netflix tried to induce large BSPs to accept its offer by tying access to its highest quality video formats to acceptance of its CDN
equipment. Larry Downes, The Strange Resurrection of Net Neutrality, CNET NEWS (Jan.
24, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57565561-38/the-strange-resurrection-ofnet-neutrality/. This may have been a strategic mistake since Netflix then was accused of
denying its own subscribers access to content in these formats and subsequently Netflix
removed the tie. For such an accusation, see id.
64 Caleb Denison, Mommy, Where Does 4K Content Come From? Ultra HD Streaming
Explained, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.com/hometheater/everything-need-know-streaming-ultra-hd-2014/.
65 Brodkin, supra note 6.
66 Verizon v. F.C.C., Nos. 11-1355, 11-1356 2014 WL 113946, at *22, *25 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (quoting Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 145 U.S.
263, 275 (1892)) (holding that BSPs are private carriers rather than common carriers).
67 Markoff, supra note 4.
68 Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5
N.C. J.L. & Tech. 227, 229-30 (2004).
61
62
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account for out-of-balance traffic. However, it can be legitimately argued that
this model is inapplicable given the architecture of last mile facilities that are
designed in an asymmetric fashion. That is, Internet networks are designed by
cable operators to provide much more capacity for end users to download traffic than to upload traffic.69 Third, one of the most economically relevant determination of ‘who pays’ is based on which party possesses the economic leverage in the negotiation. The more powerful party is likely to be the recipient of
revenue.70 This is what appears to be changing in the Internet as video traffic
comes to dominant the data usage of networks.71
As demand for video streaming alters the economics of traffic exchanges on
the Internet, it appears that (1) BSPs are likely to become gatekeepers to the
last mile for which they face limited or no competition for data intensive activities, and (2) it will become more costly to build a business on the Internet
and, thus, more likely to reduce the growth of innovation by edge providers.
Based on first impressions, it is unlikely that the new administration at the
FCC will object to this emerging change in the balance of power. In comments
by the new FCC Chairman in his first formal public address, he indicated what
appears to be an endorsement of payments from edge providers to BSPs, a contradiction with the prevailing norms of the Internet.72
III. ISSUE 2—SPECIALIZED SERVICE VERSUS BASIC INTERNET
ACCESS SERVICE
The focus of the second issue is on the last mile access network, which is the
segment of the BSP’s network that is closest to the end user, and most relevant
to the provision of specialized services that utilize this shared local infrastructure. In the Open Internet Order, the FCC permitted BSPs to offer specialized
services over last mile connections to end-users. Furthermore, and most importantly, such services are not subject to the Open Internet rules (i.e., transparency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination).73 In the Open Internet
Order, specialized services are defined as:
69 JOHN A. C. BINGHAM, ADSL, VDSL AND MULTICARRIER MODULATION 3 (John Wiley
& Sons, 2000).
70 Eric Kapf, Appeals Court Nixes Net Neutrality, NO JITTER (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.nojitter.com/post/240165351/appeals-court-nixes-net-neutrality.
71 Brodkin, supra note 6.
72 Michael Weinberg, Did the FCC Chairman Just Endorse a Pay-for-Priority Fast
Lane?, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 3, 2013), http://publicknowledge.org/blog/did-fccchairman-just-endorse-pay-play-intern.
73 OPEN INTERNET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SPECIALIZED SERVICES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 4 (Fed. Commc’n Comm’n 2013).
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[S]ervices that share capacity with broadband Internet access services over
providers’ last-mile facilities, and may develop and offer other such services in
the future. These “specialized services,” such as some broadband providers’
existing facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ
from broadband Internet access service and drive additional private investment
in broadband networks and provide end users valued services, supplementing
the benefits of the open Internet.74
Thus, over the same last mile broadband connection, an end user can access
three types of services: IP-based specialized services (not subject to the Open
Internet rules), IP-based BIAS (subject to the Open Internet rules), and legacy
services such as traditional cable television service and phone service (subject
to pre-existing rules specific to the classification of the service).75 This means
that an end user can use the connection to purchase traditional pay-television
or an IP-based pay television service (IPTV) from a cable or telephone operator and, over the same connection, purchase from an unaffiliated online distributor a competitive video service. As with the situation for the issue analyzed in Part II, multiple modes of content distribution over the same platform
present the possibility of conflicting incentives on the part of vertically integrated BSPs.
The most important reason for permitting BSPs to offer specialized services
is based on economic incentives with particular reference to stimulating investment and product innovation.76 This means that an end user can use the
connection to purchase traditional pay-television or an IP-based pay television
service (IPTV) from a cable or telephone operator and, over the same connection, purchase from an unaffiliated online distributor a competitive video service. As with the situation for the issue analyzed in Part II, multiple modes of
content distribution over the same platform present the possibility of conflicting incentives on the part of vertically integrated BSPs.
The most important reason for permitting BSPs to offer specialized services
is based on economic incentives with particular reference to stimulating investment and product innovation. In order to entice BSPs to invest in advanced
broadband capacity in last mile connections, the economic case is dependent
on generating revenue from the provision of multiple and, in some cases, new
IP-based services.77 Therefore, the trade-off to enhance the provision of capacSee 2013 OIAC ANN. REP. 15.
It is expected that BSPs will migrate traditional television and phone services to a
platform based on the Internet Protocol. At that time, all of the services provided by the BSP
over the last mile will IP-based services.
76 Jay Pil Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives, 41
RAND J. ECON. 446, 458 (2010).
77 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN & DAVID CLARK, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, OPEN INTER74
75
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ity for BIAS meant that BSPs effectively could offer private broadband channels dedicated to innovative services (such as those requiring an enhanced
quality of service compared to the level of service provided by BIAS).78 Such
services theoretically could not be provided over public broadband channels
associated with BIAS. The ability to offer a service with an enhanced quality
of service seems to confer a competitive advantage to the BSP compared to a
somewhat similar service that relies on BIAS. Nevertheless, it is the expectation of the FCC that provision of specialized services will supplement (and not
supplant) the benefits of the Open Internet.79
It is also recognized that these benefits from the provision of specialized
services must be weighed against the potential costs of permitting private services.80 First, one concern involves the incentive a BSP has to label a service as
a specialized service that otherwise could be provided over a public, nondiscriminatory channel in order to evade the consumer protections embodied in
the Open Internet rules.81 Second, a concern arises regarding incentives for the
BSP in its decisions on how much total bandwidth to provision in the last mile
and how to allocate the total bandwidth between public and private channels.82
At one time, the investment and allocation decisions were determined, in large
part, by technological considerations but, now, it has become mostly a business
decision.83 Third, a concern involves the incentive of BSPs to use specialized
services to engage in anticompetitive conduct against unaffiliated online providers of close substitutes.84
The FCC’s discussion of specialized services in the Open Internet Order was
relatively brief.85 Instead, the FCC created an Open Internet Advisory Committee (OIAC) to monitor, in part, the on-going development of specialized services by BSPs to ensure that they do not generate the types of concerns described above.86 In August 2013, the Specialized Services Working Group of
NET ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 2

(Aug. 20, 2013).
Markoff, supra note 4.
79 ZITTRAIN & CLARK, supra note 77.
80 James B. Speta, Supervising Managed Services, 60 DUKE L.J. 1715, 1720 (2011).
Professor Speta provides an excellent analysis of issues surrounding the provision of specialized services in combination with the provision of BIAS by vertically integrated BSPs.
81 Id. at 1728. This possibility is explored below in a case study of Comcast’s treatment
of its Xfinity TV video on-demand service when viewed on the Xbox video game console.
82 Id. at 1720. This possibility is addressed in the conditions imposed in the ComcastNBCU merger case discussed below.
83 Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J.
493, 501-511 (2011).
84 Speta, supra note 80. This possibility is also addressed below in the Xfinity case
study.
85 ZITTRAIN & CLARK, supra note 77.
86 Id.
78
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the OIAC issued its portion of the annual report.87 The first issue the Working
Group addressed involved identifying the parameters of exactly what types of
services can be classified as specialized services and, thus, not subject to the
Open Internet regulatory framework.88 In this discussion, possible limits on the
provision of and characteristics of specialized services are introduced.
The Working Group identified the following types of considerations to define and characterize a specialized service: (a) what is the reach of the service,
(b) does the service utilize capacity on last mile facilities, (c) is the service’s
use of capacity isolated from public Internet channels, (d) is the service a general service or an application-level service, and (e) does the service require
treatment (such as an enhanced level of quality) that otherwise would not be
available over the “best efforts” level of service provided by BIAS.89 In order
to be classified as a specialized service and, thus, be set apart from other IPbased services that are subject to the Open Internet rules, the Working Group
suggested the following answers: (a) the service is not able to reach large parts
(endpoints) of the Internet, (b) the service does utilize capacity on the last mile
facilities, (c) the service’s use of capacity is isolated from (i.e., does not impact/interfere with) the capacity allocated to BIAS, (d) the service is a specific,
application level service, and (e) the service requires a capability in order to
provide the service that could not be provided over the public Internet.90
As a basis of comparison, if one considered the BIAS provided by BSPs that
provide access to OVDs such as Netflix, the answers to the above considerations are as follows: (a) the service is intended to reach virtually all endpoints
on the Internet, (b) the service does use capacity on the last mile facilities, (c)
the service provides access to multiple applications and content providers that
all utilize the same capacity allocated to public channels, (d) the service is a
general service over the top of which multiple Internet services can be provisioned, and (e) the service is designed to utilize protocols associated with the
treatment of packets in a “best efforts” manner.91
Consideration (e) is critical and is a limiting factor, because an underlying
rationale for exempting specialized services from the Open Internet rules is to
preserve and enhance the incentives for BSPs to engage in investment and innovation that will supplement the innovative opportunities using the public
Internet.92 Stated differently, the BSP should not use the specialized services

87
88
89
90
91
92

SPECIALIZED SERVICES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
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classification as a way to avoid regulation but, rather, as a way to enhance innovation. This concern about evading Internet regulations is explored by analyzing the case involving Comcast’s decision in March 2012 to exempt its
Xfinity TV video on-demand service from a consumer’s data cap when viewed
on the Xbox video game console, an Internet-enabled device.93 This decision
led to an outcry by Open Internet proponents that Comcast’s streaming video
on demand service was violating the openness rules.94
The Xfinity controversy seems to conflate two distinct issues. First, Comcast considered a customer’s use of the Xfinity application when watched over
the Xbox video game console to be exempt from the customer’s monthly data
cap.95 Second, Comcast argued that the flow of Xfinity traffic is not provisioned over a public Internet channel but rather is provisioned differently, as an
IP serving of cable TV service.96 Each issue must be considered separately.
Suppose Comcast decided to exempt the use of the Xfinity application from its
data cap when its content is viewed through use of the Xbox video game console; the Xbox effectively then becomes a substitute receiver for the cable set
top box. If, instead, the customer watched the same content by using the services of an OVD, then the data viewed counts against the customer’s monthly
data cap.97 On the surface, this appears to be a discriminatory practice, not because of differential treatment of traffic on the last mile but in the economic
consequences of the traffic.98 In defense of the practice, it is argued that “[t]he
Xbox exemption merely allows customers to watch traditional cable consumption on television using the Xbox rather than a traditional set-top box as the
conduit.”99 However, if the data for the Comcast service and the OVD service
are provided utilizing the customer’s BIAS service, the difference in economic
Kyle Orland, Comcast: Xbox 360 On Demand Streams Won’t Count Against Data
Caps,
ARSTECHNICA
(Mar.
26,
2012,
2:54
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2012/03/comcast-xbox-on-demand-streams-wont-countagainst-data-caps/.
94 In re Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Company and NBC Universal
Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, Petition to Enforce
Merger Conditions, MB Docket No. 10-56, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Comcast, GE &
NBC Petition].
95 Id. at 4.
96 Tony Werner, The Facts About Xfinity TV and Xbox 360: Comcast is Not Prioritizing,
COMCAST CORP. (May 5, 2012), http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/the-factsabout-xfinity-tv-and-xbox-360-comcast-is-not-prioritizing.
97 Comcast, GE & NBC Petition, supra note 94, at 12.
98 James B. Speta, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference: Payment Innovation at the Content/Carriage Interface 15 (2012).
99 Daniel A. Lyons, The Impact of Data Caps and other Forms of Usage-Based Pricing
for Broadband Access 44 (Mercatus Ctr. at Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper no. 12-27,
2012).
93

2014]

Reactions by Broadband Service Providers

283

treatment is arguably discriminatory.
A related issue arises if an unaffiliated content provider wished to pay a fee
to the BSP to exempt the customer’s use of that edge provider’s content from
the data cap applied to the BIAS.100 Although at first glance such a proposal
appears to have discriminatory effects, it is possible to posit legitimate business justifications for such a business practice.101 A key consideration is
whether the BSP makes such an offer available to similarly situated, unaffiliated content providers. In the Xfinity case, the exemption only applied to
Comcast’s video on demand service.102
The second issue implicated in the Comcast case is somewhat confusing.
Comcast argues that the delivery of Xfinity content to the Xbox video game
console is isolated from the bandwidth allocated to BIAS.103 In this respect, it
looks to possess one of the necessary conditions for a specialized service and,
thus, not subject to a nondiscrimination rule. Based on how Comcast says it
provisions the service,104 it appears to meet the five characteristics described
above. If so classified, then, making an argument that the data used by the
service is not subject to the customer’s monthly data cap associated with BIAS
is irrelevant. The creation of the specialized service category means that such a
service can provide an enhanced quality of service and need not be subject to
other conditions imposed on BIAS. More confusing, Comcast says that use of
the Xfinity application on other Internet-enabled devices such as computers
and tablets is subject to the customer’s monthly data cap.105 It is only data sent
to an Xbox video game console that is exempt.106 This differential treatment
raises several questions. Does the data sent to other devices use public Internet
capacity and, thus, one reverts back to the first issue addressed. Why is only
the data sent to an Xbox video game console utilizing a private channel? Does
it make sense that the same application is classified differently depending on
the Internet-enabled device utilized to receive the data? This case demands
further examination by regulatory authorities to understand fully the reasons
for the Xfinity exemption from data caps.107
Amol Sharma et al., ESPN Explores Mobile Subsidy: Worried About Wireless-Data
Limits, Network Considers Picking Up the Tab, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2013, at B1 (It is
reported that ESPN has made such a proposal so that use of its content would not count
against the monthly data cap for a customer of its wireless provider. The hypothetical discussed in the text extends the offering to a wireline data cap plan.).
101 Id.
102 Comcast, GE & NBC Petition, supra note 94, at 4-5.
103 Werner, supra note 96.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 It may be that such an investigation is now in process, see Thomas Catan & Amy
100
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As discussed above, specialized services were not subject to any specific
limitations in the Open Internet Order but that soon changed when the FCC
and the Department of Justice imposed conditions to permit the ComcastNBCU merger in 2011.108 In 2009, Comcast, the nation’s largest BSP, proposed
a joint venture with NBCU, one of the major providers of broadcast and cable
programming.109 The vertical merger was eventually approved in 2011 but
there were restrictions imposed that affected the way in which Comcast would
be able to deliver Internet services.110 An emphasis of the merger conditions
was to protect the growth of OVDs, potential competitors to Comcast’s video
programming delivery business.111 First, with respect to services provided over
the public Internet, Comcast must treat other OVD services just as it treats its
own Internet-based video services.112 This condition is justified based on the
types of issues addressed in the Open Internet Order that examined the incentive and ability of a vertically integrated BSP to discriminate in its treatment of
traffic utilizing BIAS.113 Effectively, this means that Comcast will be subject to
many of the provisions of the Open Internet Order until 2018 even if the judicial process overturns or remands all or parts of the Open Internet Order.114
Furthermore, Comcast must also subject its traffic to any usage-based billing
plans, such as data caps, that applies to OVD traffic.115 This merger condition
has led net neutrality proponents to argue that the Xfinity case, discussed
above, is a violation of the merger agreement as well as an antitrust violation.116
Schatz, U.S. Probes Cable for Limits on Net Video, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023034442045774629511663884624.html.
108 Competitive Impact Statement at 1-2, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv00106 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id. at 2.
111 Id. at 3.
112 Id. at 38.
113 SPECIALIZED SERVICES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 73.
114 Based on oral arguments presented at the D.C. Circuit Court in Fall 2013 regarding
the Open Internet Order, many legal scholars and practitioners expected a legal setback for
the FCC rules. See, e.g., John Mansell, Bye Bye Net Neutrality?, LIGHT READING (Nov. 19,
2013), www.lightreading.com/services-apps/broadband-services/bye-bye-net-neutrality/a/did706655. In January 2014, the D.C. Circuit did vacate the no blocking and nondiscrimination rules while approving the transparency rule. Importantly, the FCC was found to have
direct statutory authority to impose rules on the practices of broadband providers toward
edge providers. The FCC is now in the process of rewriting the openness rules to conform to
the directives of the D.C. Circuit. The revised openness rules must contain flexibility so that
broadband providers are not treated as common carriers. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623
(D.C. Cir. 2014). Hopefully, the revised rules will incorporate the concerns of this article
regarding interconnection and specialized services issues.
115 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 108, at 2.
116 Melissa Lipman, DOJ Needs Collusion, Dominance to Make Cable Antitrust Case,
LAW360 (June 13, 2012, 10:16 pm), www.law360.com/articles/349639/doj-needs-collusion-
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Second, with respect to specialized services that are offered over the same
last mile facilities as BIAS, Comcast must “ensure that OVDs will have access
to any Specialized Service Comcast may offer that includes comparable services.”117 In practicality, this applies an open access mandate for Comcast’s private Internet channels for rival OVDs. This could become a controversial issue, given the unrelenting growth in the demand for video services over the
Internet.118 Also, merger conditions narrowed the definition of specialized services compared to that offered in the Open Internet Order, thus, subjecting additional services to the Open Internet rules specifically for Comcast.119
Broadband Internet access service, video services regulated under Title VI, and
existing VoIP telephony services are not to be treated as specialized services.120
Lastly, in order to protect the public Internet from being starved for capacity, a merger condition instructs Comcast to “maintain its public Internet access service at a level that typically would allow any user on the network to
download content from the public Internet at speeds of at least 12 megabits per
second in markets where it has deployed DOCSIS 3.0.”121 Again, this reflects
the interest of governmental authorities in protecting the development of
OVDs. One can see that the governmental authorities anticipated that a decision on the allocation of capacity between public and private channels could be
used by BSPs to limit the growth and competitiveness of OVDs. Since such a
similar adverse allocation decision could be made by any BSP, it seems reasonable to consider extending such a mandate to all BSPs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Just about everyone agrees that the Internet has been and should remain
open. However, precisely what does open mean and whether the government
should mandate such a feature is the subject of much debate. The Open Internet Order created rules to preserve the openness feature of the public Internet
over the last mile. These rules are calibrated based on appropriate economic
concerns that vertically integrated BSPs with market power are positioned to
engage in anticompetitive behavior toward unaffiliated edge providers generating harmful effects on end users. The FCC response to address these concerns
is confined to actions that BSPs can take in terms of blocking or engaging in
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117 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 108, at 1.
118 SPECIALIZED SERVICES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 73.
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unreasonable discrimination in the public channels over the last mile. This limited focus fails to account for actions that BSPs can take with respect to interconnection agreements that can frustrate the objectives of the openness rules.
To begin to address this concern, a first step would be to invoke a transparency
requirement for interconnection agreements so governmental authorities and
other interested parties can understand the economics underlying the specified
terms and conditions of interconnection. In addition, the ability of vertically
integrated BSPs to use specialized services to circumvent the openness rules
still remains a viable option. Governmental authorities addressed this concern
with specific conditions imposed on Comcast’s Internet services during the
Comcast-NBCU merger process. Extension of these types of conditions to all
vertically integrated BSPs with market power should be considered as a logical
next step for regulatory action.

